Suchergebnisse

The paper attempts to identify the relationship between trust viewed through private good, club good, private external effects and public good, and pension systems, presented in the form of vertical and horizontal social contracts. Guided by the typology of benefits in the analysis of trust, the author argues: trust in a horizontal pension contract develops in a network of transactions regarding the production of a pension good and is a combination of its various types. In a vertical contract, the possibilities of individuals' retirement planning and the position of private structures in the pension market are limited, that reduces the role of trust as a private and club good and strengthens the importance of trust in the form of a public good. The author shows that in a horizontal pension contract, trust is a basic prerequisite for all pension interactions. The effectiveness of a horizontal pension contract depends on the level of trust: low trust increases transaction costs and makes pension planning unviable. The author concludes that in conditions of low confidence, satisfaction of pension needs is easier to organize through a vertical type contract in which pension needs are satisfied centrally. At the same time, low trust of Russians to pension institutions is the result of a vertical pension contract.

The author considers the concept of «pensionary good» and the specifics of its production at the state and non-state levels. The purpose of the study is to analyze the actions aimed at creating a «pensionary good» under the influence of incentives and coercion. Drawing on the theory of goods, the author comes to conclusion that the elements of pensionary good can be produced in the form of public goods, merit goods, club goods and private goods. The author identifies the specifics of pensionary good structure at the analyzed levels and shows that national pension in the Russian Federation is based on coercion, with stimulation being of secondary importance. Non-state-funded retirement also uses the coercion and incentives. It has been established that coercion and incentives provide contradictory results as mechanisms used in the process of producing a pensionary good. While preparing the article, the author used the data from the Federal Statistic Service, the Pension Fund of Russia and various sociological surveys and scientific works on pensions and insurance. The conclusions of the study may be useful for further research on the development of Russian pension system.

The paper presents the analysis of pensioning as a social contract. The aim of research is to reveal the features of the Russian pension contract taking into account transformations of pension process in the 2000s. In accordance with the aims this article analyzes the contract bases of pension interactions. As a methodological basis the author applies the theory of social contracts, institutional model of the Principal-Agent and the McGuire-Olson theory of stationary bandit. The conducted research offers to consider pensioning as a special case of a social contract. It also identifies the general trend in changes of the Russian pension contract during the period since 2002 till the present period. The pension policy in 2002-2018 resulted in further strengthening of the state position as a stakeholder of the pension contract, decrease in the role of private structures in pensioning, replacement of pension accumulating with a distribution method, reduction in the value of personified interactions in the pension process and, on the contrary, increase in the role of common pension rules as an implicit basis of the pension contract.

The article provides the analysis of pension inequality in the system of modern state pension provision in Russia. The purpose of work is to reveal pension inequality at each stage of forming pension good and to show the correlation between pension inequality and the implementation of pension preferences mechanism in the system of state pensioning. The paper briefly considers the evolution of social inequality concepts and studies the reasons for social inequality. The author views pension inequality as the subject differentiations arising in the course of forming and receiving pension good. The research analyzes the factors which entail deprivations both in the course of forming pension rights and receiving pension good. The analysis reveals numerous manifestations of pension inequality at different stages of pension process and identifies the correlation between particular forms of pension inequality and pension preferences policy. The paper offers conclusions and recommendations that can be used for further examination of particular aspects in pension inequality.